A CRITICISM OF THE GERTZ PUBLIC FIGURE/
PRIVATE FIGURE TEST IN THE CONTEXT
OF THE CORPORATE
DEFAMATION PLAINTIFF

In New York Times v. Sullivan the Supreme Court created a
first amendment defamation privilege. The Court then struggled
to find the appropriatetest to determine when the privilege applies. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court's concernfor the
private individual's reputation resulted in the creation of the
public figure/privatefigure test. Two problems inherent in the
Gertz test became apparentwhen the publicfigure/privatefigure
formula was applied to corporate defamation plaintiffs. This
Comment analyzes these problems in light of the goals of the defamationprivilege and proposes solutions to the problems.

INODUCTION

The law of defamation involves two important competing interests: society's right and need for widespread dissemination of information versus the individual's right to his own good name. In
today's age of mass electronic and print media these interests
conflict more violently than ever before. As the ability for wider
information dissemination increases, the risk of harm to the individual's reputation becomes greater. Defamation in today's television, radio and high circulation print media means greater injury
to one's reputation.
Because defamation law prior to 1964 was inadequate to deal
with this rising conflict, the United States Supreme Court entered
the area with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.' New York Times
attempted to reconcile this conflict by finding a qualified privilege
in the first amendment. 2 The boundaries and nature of this privilege have been the center of controversy for the last seventeen
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Id. at 283.
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years. Yet, this area of the law remains unsettled.3
First amendment protection was first extended to statements
concerning public officials.4 It was then expanded to include public figures, 5 and later to anybody acting in an area of public interest, 6 then limited again to public figures.7 As the law stands today
with respect to the first amendment defamation privilege, the controlling case is Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 8 as modified by subsequent cases. 9 The Gertz public figure/private figure test
determines whether the first amendment privilege exists. This
test can be criticized in two respects. First, application of the test
leads to the confusion
of the terms "public controversy" and
"public interest."10 Second, the test raises problems with respect
to its application to corporate defamation plaintiffs." More specifically, in light of the nature of a corporation's reputational interest, is the public figure/private figure test the most appropriate
test to use to determine if the privilege exists in corporate defamation cases?
This Comment will analyze the development of the Gertz
formula, examine the cases attempting to apply it to corporate
defamation plaintiffs, and present resolutions to the two criticisms stated above.
FAIR CommENT DOCTRINE
Prior to 1964, there was no constitutional privilege for libelous
speech, 12 and the scales were tipped heavily in favor of the private individual's reputation. The United States Supreme Court
13
summed up the situation well in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
stating that "there are certain well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech, the prevention of which have never been
thought to raise any constitutional problem. These include the
3. See text accompanying notes 12-61 infra.
4. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
5. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
6. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
7. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
8. Id.
9. See text accompanying notes 54-61 infra.
10. Reliance Insurance Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Trans
World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Martin
Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947 (D.D.C. 1976);
Vegod Corp. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 25 Cal. 3d 763, 603 P.2d 14, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 97 (1979).
11. See note 10 supra.
12. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TOaTs 819 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
13. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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lewd, and obscene, the profane and the libelous."14 There did exist, however, a qualified privilege resembling the subsequently
created constitutional privilege. The "fair comment" doctrine allowed a privilege for commentary on matters of public interest. 5
The doctrine allowed expressions of opinion, but not erroneous
statements of fact; if the expression of opinion was based on un6
true facts, it was not protected by the "fair comment" doctrine.
NEw YORK TIMES AND ITS PROGENY

In 1964 the United States Supreme Court extended and modified the fair comment privilege in New York Times v. Sullivan.17
This case opened up an area of first amendment law that has
been consistently changed and modified ever since the decision
was handed down. The area is still in a state of flux and will probably continue to change as new problems are presented to the
court.
The Court in New York Times after noting the "national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust and wide open,"18 found in the first amendment a qualified privilege in the area of defamation. The Court
held that the first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech
and press require a qualified privilege for critics of public conduct
of public officials. 19 The privilege protects those who defame a
public official without actual malice.2 0 Unlike the common law
fair comment privilege, the constitutional privilege set out in New
14. Id. at 571-72.
15. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 792, 820.
16. Id. at 819.
17. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). This case arose out of an advertisement paid for by the
Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the
South. The ad spoke of mistreatment of civil rights workers by the Alabama police. Some of the incidents described in the ad were inaccurate or never occurred.
William B. Sullivan, a city commissioner for Montgomery in charge of the police
department, brought a defamation action contending that the ad referred to him.
The fair comment privilege in Alabama was limited to commentary and opinions
based on true statements. The jury awarded Sullivan $500,000 and the Alabama
Supreme Court affirmed.
18. Id. at 270.
19. Id. at 282-83.
20. I. at 280. The Court defined actual malice as "knowledge that" the statement "was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." The
Court later defined reckless disregard of the truth as publication with actual and
serious doubts concerning the story's accuracy. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390
U.S. 727, 731 (1968).

York Times extends to erroneous statements of fact as well as
opinion and comment.2 1 The Court reasoned that "erroneous
statement is inevitable in free debate and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing
space' that 'they need to survive.' "22 The Court feared that without this privilege the public debate would be limited and criticism
discouraged. 23 Thus, to encourage public debate and criticism,
public officials must show actual malice in defamation actions. 24
In the companion cases of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts25 and
Associated Press v. Walker,2 6 the Supreme Court extended the
qualified first amendment privilege to public figures involved in
issues of public interest.27 Because of the similarities between
the New York Times plaintiff and the plaintiffs involved in Walker
and Butts, the Court held that the first amendment privilege
should apply.28 Nevertheless, the majority opinion applied a dif-

ferent standard than the actual malice standard of New York
Times. The Court held that public figures must show "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the
standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by
responsible publishers." 29 In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice
Warren thought the actual malice standard should apply 3o and in
31
subsequent decisions his view was followed.
21. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278-79 (1964).
22. Id. at 271-72.
23. Id. at 279.
24. Id. at 283.
25. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). In this case the Saturday Evening Post published an
article which accused Wally Butts, then Athletic Director of the University of
Georgia, of conspiring to fix the 1962 Georgia-Alabama game. The basis of the
charge was a questionable source who overheard a telephone call between Butts
and Bear Bryant, the Alabama coach. Butts sued for libel and recovered 3 million
dollars in damages which was reduced to $460,000 by the Court of Appeals. The
Supreme Court affirmed.
26. Id. This case involved a news dispatch issued by Associated Press during
the turbulent period when James Meredith, a black student, was forcibly enrolled
in the University of MississippL The dispatch accused former general Edwin
Walker of leading a violent crowd against the federal marshalls enrolling Meredith. Walker brought a libel suit and was awarded $500,000 in damages by the
Texas state court. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed and the Texas
Supreme Court declined to review. The United States Supreme Court reversed.
27. Id. at 154-55.
28. Id. at 155.
[TJhe public interest in the circulation of the materials here involved, is
not less than that involved in New York Times. And both Butts and
Walker commanded a substantial amount of independent public interest
at the time of the publications; both, in our opinion, would have been labeled 'public figures' under ordinary tort rules.
Id. at 154.
29. Id.
30. Id at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
31. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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After the Butts and Walker decisions, the question remained
whether the New York Times standard would be applied to private figures involved in issues of public interest. Basically, the issue was whether the status of the individual or the nature of the
subject matter involved would be the important element in determining whether to apply the actual malice standard.
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. ,32 the Supreme Court's plurality decision temporarily answered the question in favor of the
latter. "The public's primary interest is in the event; the public
focus is on the conduct of the participant and content, effect and
significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity
or notoriety."33 The plurality stressed the public interest nature
of the issues involved in New York Times and Butts34 and downplayed the status of the individuals involved. The Rosenbloom
plurality reiterated the "profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open."35 The opinion stated that the distinction between private and public figures "makes no sense in terms of the
first amendment guarantees." 36 The New York Times actual malice test was applied to public officials and public figures not because they had less of an interest in protecting their reputations,
but to encourage "ventilation of public issues. ' 37 The Court
feared that the public figure/private figure test would leave the
public figure's private life unprotected while inhibiting discussion
of public issues merely because they involved private persons. 38
Thus, stressing the importance of the subject matter, the plurality
in Rosenbloom created the public interest test which required
that anybody involved in issues of public interest must prove ac32. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). This case involved a report by Philadelphia's radio station WIP concerning the arrest of George Rosenbloom for possession of obscene
material. The report characterized the seized material as obscene instead of "allegedly" obscene material. A subsequent report on Rosenbloom's suit for injunction referred to the plaintiffs as "girlie book peddlers" and characterized their suit
as an attempt to force police to "lay off the smut literature racket." Rosenbloom
was acquitted and brought suit and recovered $750,000 which was reduced to
$250,000 on remittitur. The Court of Appeals reversed and the Supreme Court affirmed.
33. Id. at 43.
34. Id. at 42.
35. Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 46.
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 48.

tual malice to recover damages. 39

Rosenbloom marked the height of protection given defamatory
speech. Critics argued that Rosenbloom tipped the scales too far
in favor of protecting defamation, because few topics had been
found not to involve issues of public interest.40 The critics feared
that such application of the actual malice test to broad areas of
public interest effectively barred successful protection of an indi41
vidual's interest in his reputation.
The Supreme Court responded to this fear three years later in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.42 The majority in Gertz criticized Rosenbloom as an inadequate balance between the first amendment
values of free speech and press and the individual's interest in his
reputation. The Court stated that the public interest test infringes too much on the legitimate state interest in protecting the
individual's good name,43 and would require the court to make ad
hoc decisions as to what are and are not issues of public interestA4 Thus, the Court held that the public figure/private figure
distinction would better balance these competing interests. 45 The
Court reasoned that individuals who seek public office or public
notoriety thrust themselves into the vortex of public controversy
and have more access to the media to rebut any defamation, and
therefore, they are public figures and subject to the New York
Times actual malice standard.46
Two types of public figures were identified in Gertz. The first is
39. Id. at 54.
40. See Comment, The Expanding ConstitutionalProtectionfor the News Mediafrom Liability of Defamation: Predictabilityand the News Synthesis, 70 MIcH.
L. REV. 1547, 1560-62 nn.94-96 (1972).

41. See id.
42. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). This case involved an article carried in AMERiCAN OPIN-

a monthly publication of the John Birch Society. Petitioner, Elmer Gertz, was
a lawyer representing the Nelson family in civil litigation against a policeman
named Nucio who had been found guilty of second degree murder for killing the
Nelson youth. The article falsely stated that Gertz had framed Nucio in the criminal prosecution, had a criminal record, had taken part in the 1968 Chicago demonstrations and had been a member of the Marxist League for Industrial Democracy
and the Intercollegiate Socialist Society. Gertz was denied recovery in his libel
suit in the lower court, but the Supreme Court reversed.
43. Id. at 348.
The Court stated that the individual's interest in his private reputation:
[R]eflects no more than our basic concept of essential dignity and worth
of every human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of orION,

dered liberty. The protection of private personality, like the protection of

life itself, is left primarily to the individual states under the ninth and
tenth amendments. But this does not mean that the right is entitled to
any less recognition by this court as a basis of our constitutional system.
Id. at 341.
44. Id. at 346.
45. Id. at 343.
46. Id. at 344-45, 348.
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the individual who achieves "such pervasive fame and notoriety
that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts."47 The more common type of public figure is the individual
who "voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited
range of issues."48
By using the term "public controversy," the Court created two
problems for subsequent courts attempting to apply the Gertz
public figure/private figure test. The first is a definitional problem. Does "public controversy" as used in Gertz mean the same
as "public interest" as used in Rosenbloom?49 Subsequent cases
applying the Gertz formula have often confused the two terms
and used them interchangeably.SO The second problem created
by the use of the term "public controversy" is that the Court does
not completely abandon a test based on the nature of the subject
matter in favor of a test based solely on the status of the individual. The nature of the subject matter is still an element to determine whether the privilege exists. After Gertz, courts are
required to find a public controversy before they find that the defamed individual was a limited public figure.5 ' To label the defamed individual a limited voluntary public figure,52 Gertz
requires a finding that the individual voluntarily injected himself
into, and that there did exist, a public controversy. Here the focus
is on both the voluntary status of the individual and the nature of
the subject matter. To label the defamed individual a limited involuntary public figure, 53 Gertz requires only that the individual
47. Id. at 351.
48. Id.
49. The term "public controversy" is a slippery one. Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448 (1976), attempted to distinguish between "public interest and public
controversy." Id. at 454. Yet the distinction remains unclear. See text accompanying notes 62-121 infra.
50. See, e.g., Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814
(N.D. Cal. 1977).
51. As used in this Comment, the term "limited public figure" refers to those
individuals who become public figures for a limited range of issues. The term includes both voluntary and involuntary limited public figures. See Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974).
52. As used in this Comment, the term "limited voluntary public figure" refers
to those individuals who "voluntarily inject themselves ... into a particular public
controversy." See id.
53. As used in this Comment, the term "limited involuntary public figure" refers to those individuals who are "drawn into a particular public controversy and
thereby become public figures for a limited range of issues." See id.

was involved in a public controversy. The focus here is only on
the nature of the subject matter, which makes the limited involuntary public figure formula look much like the Rosenbloom public interest test.
Perhaps this similarity is the reason the Court has ignored the
limited involuntary public figure category in three subsequent
cases: Time, Inc. v. Firestone,54 Hutchinson v. Proxmire55 and
Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc. 56 All three cases cited and
quoted the Gertz rule without any reference to the involuntary
public figure category.5 7 They each avoided that aspect of their
respective situations which indicated the existence of a limited
involuntary public figure.5 8 In fact, in Wolston, the Court even ad54. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). This case involved an article in Time Magazine which
reported that Russell Firestone, an heir to the Firestone rubber fortune, was
granted a divorce from Mary Alice Firestone on the grounds of extreme cruelty
and adultery. The correct grounds were extreme cruelty and lack of domestication. Mrs. Firestone filed a libel action and recovered $100,000 in the Florida circuit
court. The decision was ultimately affirmed by the Florida and United States
Supreme Courts. The United States Supreme Court held Mary Alice Firestone
not to be a public figure despite the widespread media attention the divorce action
received. The Court stated that just because Mary Alice Firestone had to go to
court to deal with her divorce and the press covers it does not make it a public
controversy.
55. 443 U.S. 111 (1979). This case involved statements, press releases, newsletters, and phone calls to federal agencies made by Senator Proxmire. Senator
Proxmire made Hutchinson's research on monkeys, the subject of his Golden
Fleece of the Month Award which is given to publicize wasteful government
spending. Hutchinson brought a libel suit in which the district court granted summary judgment for Proxmire holding that Hutchinson was a public figure. The
court of appeals affirmed, but the United States Supreme Court reversed holding
that Hutchinson was not a public figure because he did not thrust himself into a
public controversy.
56. 443 U.S. 157 (1979). This case involved an article published in Reader's Digest which falsely stated that Wolston was indicted as, and actually was, a Soviet
spy. In 1957 and 1958 a federal grand jury was investigating Soviet spying in the
United States. Wolston's aunt and uncle were arrested as spies. Wolston failed to
respond to a subpoena to testify before the grand jury. A district court issued an
order to show cause why petitioner should not be held in criminal contempt. On
the date of this order Wolston offered to testify but was refused. He pleaded
guilty to the contempt charge when his wife became hysterical when asked to testify. These events were reported in the Washington and New York newspapers.
Wolston brought a libel suit and the district court found him to be a public figure
and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding Wolston
not to be a public figure.
57. For the most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of
especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of
such pervasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures
for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures have
thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.
See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453 (1976); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443
U.S. 111, 134 (1979); Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 164 (1979).
58. In Firestone, the Court avoids the idea that Mary Alice was drawn into a
public controversy by the amount of press she received. The Court correctly held
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mitted that petitioner was dragged unwillingly into the controversy 5 9
Despite the Court's emphasis on the voluntary aspect of
Gertz,60 it still had to determine whether a public controversy existed. The defamed persons in each of the three cases were all involved in situations that could possibly have been public
controversies. 61 Therefore, before it could label the persons private figures or limited public figures, the Court had to use a Rosenbloom's public interest analysis to determine if the subject
matter of each case constituted a public controversy. If it did and
the persons voluntarily involved themselves in public controversies, they would be deemed public figures.
As the test stands today, if a person cannot be classified as the
rare public figure for all issues, the court must look to the nature
of the subject matter and the voluntariness of the individual's involvement in the subject matter to determine if the person is a
limited public figure. The court must find both that the subject
matter was a public controversy, and that the defamed individual
voluntarily entered the controversy. No longer, it seems, can a
person be "drawn into a particular public controversy." Thus, the
test to determine whether the first amendment defamation privilege will apply is an unclear combination of the subject matter
emphasis of Rosenbloom and the voluntary involvement emphasis
of Gertz.
THE CORPORATE PLAiM

CASES

The four corporate plaintiff cases since Gertz point out two
problems with the public figure/private figure test. First, the
that the controversy surrounding her divorce was not a public controversy, but
whatever it was, there were aspects of her being drawn into it. In Proxmire, although government spending is a public controversy, the Court avoided the fact
that Hutchinson was drawn into that public controversy by Proxmire's actions. In
Wolston, Woston was drawn into a public controversy by the subpoena.
59. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 166 (1979).
60. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453-56 (1976); Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
443 U.S. 111, 135-36 (1979); Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 165-68
(1979).

61. In Firestone, the Court had to determine if the divorce and the press conferences were a public controversy. In Hutchinson, the Court had to determine
whether Hutchinson's voluntary taking of money for his work from the government was a public controversy. In Wolston, Woston was voluntarily absent from
the grand jury proceedings. The Court had to determine whether the proceedings
were a public controversy.

terms public controversy and public interest are used confusingly,
indicating a need for a clear statement as to the distinction between them. The second problem concerns the appropriateness
of the application of the public figure/private figure test to corporate plaintiffs. The public figure/private figure test focuses on the
nature of the defamed individual's reputation. Is that reputation
personal or public? Prior to Gertz, the emphasis was on the nature of the subject matter. The public interest test with its sole
concern being the subject matter could be applied to all plaintiffs
regardless of the nature of the individual's reputation. However,
now that the courts must also look to the nature of the reputation
involved, the question is raised whether Gertz with its concern for
personal reputation is the appropriate test to apply in corporate
plaintiff cases. While natural persons may sue for damage to
their personal reputation, 62 a corporation does not have a personal reputation and can only sue for damage to its business reputation. 63 A corporation,
is an artificial entity, created by law, existing separate and apart from the
individuals who are its stockholders, directors, managers, employees and
customers.... [I]t has no personality, no dignity that can be assailed, no
feelings that can be touched [by defamation]. A man of good reputation
possesses attributes of personal honor and dignity, but a corporation cannot be libeled in this regard.6 4

Thus, the distinction between public reputation and personal reputation in Gertz creates the dilemma of how to apply the Gertz
formula to a corporation which does not have a personal reputation. Three federal district courts65 and one state supreme court 66
have dealt with the issue.
The first case attempting to resolve the issue was Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co.67 After analyzing the

differences between a corporation and a natural person in terms
of defamation law, the court held that the Rosenbloom public interest test should apply to corporate defamation plaintiffs.68

The case involved an article in the Washington Star. The article alleged that a weekend party for a soon to be married Air
Force official was given at a hunting lodge leased by Martin Marl62. See PROSSER, supra note 12, at 744-45.
63. See PROSSER, supra note 12, at 745-46; 50 AM. JUR. 2d Libel and Slander
§ 315 (1970).
64. R. PHELPS & E. HAMLTON, LIBEL 80-81 (rev. ed. 1978).
65. Reliance Insurance Co. v. Barton's, 442 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Trans
World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Martin
Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947 (D.D.C. 1976).
66. Vegod Corp. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 25 Cal. 3d 763, 160 Cal. Rptr.
97, 603 P.2d 14 (1979).
67. 417 F. Supp. 947 (D.D.C. 1976).
68. Id. at 956.
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etta, a defense contractor. The article stated that about one-third
of the forty to fifty guests were defense department personnel.
The article also stated that two prostitutes attended the party and
that one was paid $3,000 by a Martin Marietta representative.
Martin Marietta brought suit for damages and an injunction demanding a retraction. Defendant moved for summary judgment
claiming that actual malice had not been shown by the evidence.
The court granted the motion holding that plaintiff was required
69
to show actual malice and failed to do so.

To reach its holding the court first analyzed the goals sought in
the Gertz public figure/private figure formula. The court interpreted Gertz as primarily concerned with protecting the personal
reputation of natural persons.7O Citing Gertz, the court stated:
It is quite clear from the court's opinion, however, that the values considered important enough to merit accommodation with interests protected
by the first amendment are associated solely with natural persons, and

that corporations, while legal persons for 7some
purposes, possess none of
1
the attributes the court sought to protect.

After establishing that Gertz focused on the natural person, the
court pointed out the difference between corporations and natural
persons "long reflected" in the law of libel.72 The court noted that
in the law of defamation a corporation has no personal reputation
and may only sue for damage to its credit or business.7 3 Thus, the
court held that the Gertz public figure/private figure test did not
apply to corporate plaintiffs.7 4 The court compared corporate
plaintiffs with natural persons who voluntarily become unlimited
7
public figures7 5 and thereby lose the protection given by Gertz.

6

Since the Gertz test is designed to determine whether a natural
person has lost protection of his private reputation, it does not
69. Id.
70. Id. at 955.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. This traditional doctrine does no more than recognize the obvious fact
that a libel action brought on behalf of a corporation does not involve the
essential dignity and worth of every human being' and, thus, is not 'at the

root of any decent system of ordered liberty.' Consequently, a corporate
libel action is not 'a basic of our constitutional system,' and need not force
the first amendment to yield as far as it would be in a private libel action.
Id.
74. Id.
75. The term unlimited public figure, as used in this article, refers to public
figures for all purposes. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974).
76. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 955
(DM.C. 1976).

make sense to apply Gertz to corporations which do not have pri77
vate lives.
After rejecting the Gertz test, the court had to determine the
appropriate standard to apply. Recognizing that the state has
some interest in protecting the business reputation of a corporation,78 the court chose to apply the Rosenbloom public interest
test. 79 Thus, when a corporate plaintiff is defamed, it must prove
actual malice if the defamation involves something of public interest.
Martin Marietta was also based on an alternative holding in
case "higher courts, which have yet to consider the problem,
should find it necessary to fit corporate plaintiffs into [the] ill
fitting mold" of the public figure/private figure test. 80 The court
held that the Martin Marietta Corporation was at least a limited
82
public figure8l if not a public figure for all purposes.
The case of Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press,8 3 involved an article carried on the AP and UPI wire services and
published by Copley Press's San Diego newspapers. The article
reported that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had issued
complaints against eight companies, including Trans World Accounts Inc., charging them with four counts of unfair and deceptive practices. The article failed to distinguish which of the
charges Trans World Accounts was charged with in the FTC complaint. Only two of the four charges were actually made against
Trans World. Trans World brought a libel action in which the defendants AP, UPI and Copley Press moved for summary judgment.
The court held that the Gertz public figure/private figure test
was the appropriate test to apply to corporate defamation plaintiffs.84 Martin Marietta's application of Rosenbloom was rejected
for three reasons. "First, the Supreme Court in Gertz rejected Rosenbloom without qualification." 85 The court noted that Gertz rejected the public interest test because it would be too great an
77. Id.
78. Id. at 956.
79. Id.
This approach grants some deference to the values underlying corporate
libel actions grounded in state law, while at the same time resulting in

only a minor encroachment on the first amendment, which was designed

primarily to defend the market place of ideas.

See id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 957.
82. Id.
83. 425 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Cal. 1977).

84. Id. at 819.
85. Id.
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infringement on the state interest in protecting the private individual's reputation and would force the courts to make ad hoc determinations of what issues are of public interest.86 This first
reason is simply a restatement of the Gertz rationale as it applies
to private individuals and ignores the distinction between human
defamation plaintiffs and their corporate counterparts.
The Martin Marietta case was also rejected because under California law there is no difference between the protected interests
of corporations and natural persons since they both can recover
special, general, and punitive damages. 87 For this proposition the
court cited Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. American Federationof Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations,88 which held that
corporations can sue for damage to their business reputation. Di
Giorgio recognized that while both corporations and natural persons have business reputations, only natural persons have any
type of private or personal reputation. 89
The final reason for rejecting Martin Marietta was that the true
differences between corporations and natural persons are often
unclear.
[T]he line between the interests of natural persons and corporations is
frequently fuzzy and ill-defined. Various legal considerations have long
led to the incorporation of businesses that are in economic reality but individual proprietorships or partnerships.... For that additional reason,
it seems that for purposes of applying the first amendment to defamation
claims, the distinction between corporations and individuals is one without a difference. 9 0

The court feared that if Martin Marietta were followed, small corporations that are run much like small non-incorporated businesses would be unfairly subject to a harsher standard as a
corporate defamation plaintiff than would their non-incorporated
counterparts. By merely incorporating, an individual would lose
some protection of his reputation. The court refused to condone
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
215 Cal. App. 2d 560, 30 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1963).
Id. at 215 Cal. App. 2d 560, 570-71, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 356.

While a corporation has no reputation in the personal sense to be defamed by words, such as those imputing unchastity, which would offset
the purely personal reputation of an individual, it has a business reputation, and language which casts aspersions upon its business character is
actionable.
Id. at 571, Cal. Rptr. at 356.
90. Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 819 (N.D.

Cal. 1977).

this bias and held that the same standard should apply to both
corporations and natural persons.
The next question was whether Trans World Accounts was a
public figure. The court concluded that Trans World Accounts
was neither an unlimited public figure, 9 ' nor a limited voluntary
public figure. 92 Instead, Trans World Accounts was labeled a limited involuntary public figure.93 The court held that 'T£rans World
may not have been a 'public figure' until the proposed complaint
issued, but when it did, it was clearly drawn into a particular controversy."94 Because the function of the FTC is to act in the public interest and publicize complaints, this "particular controversy"
was a public controversy. Here, the court used the term public interest to find and define a public controversy enabling it to deem
Trans World Accounts a limited involuntary public figure. The
use of '"public interest" to define "public controversy" shows confusion as to the meaning of the two terms and demonstrates the
continued existence of the Rosenbloom public interest test in the
public figure/private figure test. Thus, Trans World was not only
decided on the basis of the abandoned limited involuntary public
figure category, but also on the basis of a disguised Rosenbloom
public interest test.
Reliance Insurance Co. v. Barron's,9 5 involved an article published by Barron's criticizing plaintiff s preliminary prospectus, (a
document that provided information to the public concerning a
proposed sale of stock). The article accused plaintiff of employing
"creative accounting" concepts and engaging in improper business practices. It also alleged that the proceeds of the proposed
sale would move upstream to plaintiff's parent corporation to the
detriment of plaintiff, its policyholder and its minority shareholders. Reliance Insurance brought a libel suit based on this publication.
The court was presented with the problem of which precedent
to follow:96 Martin Marietta's application of Rosenbloom or Trans
World's application of Gertz. The court without analysis or dis91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 821.
94. Id.
The same result might not happen today after Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S.
111 (1979) and Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979). In these two
cases the United States Supreme Court refused to characterize plaintiffs as limited involuntary public figures when it would have been easy to do so. Instead, the
Court chose to ignore the limited involuntary public figure status created by Gertz.
See text accompanying notes 55-61 supra.
95. 442 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
96. Id. at 1347.
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97
cussion chose to follow Trans World and apply Gertz.
Nevertheless, Reliance Insurance, like Trans World, slipped
into using a public interest test to determine whether Reliance Insurance was a public figure.9 8 The court first noted the large size
of plaintiff corporation and that its shares were publicly traded on
the New York Stock Exchange.9 9 The court then stated that
"[t] here has been great public interest in Insurance and its afiliated companies over the past several years, particularly with respect to the circumstances surrounding its acquisition."oo
Reliance had also thrust itself into the public arena by offering to
sell its shares to the general public.lOl Based on these reasons,
the court held Reliance Insurance to be both an unlimited public
figure and a limited voluntary public figure.10 2
In arguing its status as a public figure, Reliance pointed out that
one of the "theoretical underpinnings"103 of the Gertz test was access to the media to rebut libelous speech. Reliance noted, however, that the federal securities laws prevented such media
access. The court rejected this media access argument as no
more than a "make weight."1 0 4
Reliance then argued that it did not voluntarily thrust itself into
the media.105 The court rejected this argument as well, holding
that Reliance's offer to sell to the public satisfied the voluntary involvement in a public controversy requirement.1 0 6 The court held
that this offer to sell to the public could be reported on as a matter of public interest. "Investigative reporting is not limited to impeachment of presidents or the exposure of licentious
congressmen. The public interest is served equally when reporters find a 'Deep Throat' in the executive suite. .... ,"107 Thus,
the court was able to define Reliance as a public figure by using a
97. Id.
98. See id. at 1349.
99. Id. at 1348.
100. Id. (emphasis added).
101. Id.
102. Id.

103. Reliance Insurance Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
104. Id. 'There are many public figures who are so scorned and reviled by the
media as to have little or no access for purposes of counteracting a libel. These
remain yet public figures." Id.
105. Id. at 1349.
106. Id.
107. Id. (emphasis added).

public interest test. 0 8
The most recent court to be presented with the issue of
whether the public interest test or the public figure/private figure
test should be applied to corporate defamation plaintiffs was the
California Supreme Court in Vegod Corporation v. American
Broadcast Cos. Inc. 10 9 Plaintiff corporations were in the business
of closing out stores that were going out of business. The popular
City of Paris department store in San Francisco was going out of
business and plaintiffs were hired to conduct the closing. ABC's
San Francisco television station aired a report which alleged that
a Better Business Bureau spokesman told a reporter that "two
outside companies, Vega [sic] Corporation and Western Institute
of Retailers [sic] have been brought in to handle the closeout, a
closeout the Better Business Bureau says has deceived the public. . . ."1o Plaintiffs brought a libel action in which the lower
court found them to be public figures under the Gertz test. The
Supreme Court of California reversed holding that Gertz applied,"' and that plaintiffs were not public figures. 112
In arriving at its conclusion that Gertz should apply to corporate defamation plaintiffs, the court followed the reasoning of
Trans World."3 In applying the Gertz test the court for the first
time found a corporate plaintiff not to be a public figure." 4 In order to find plaintiffs were non-public figures, the court had to determine whether plaintiffs were involved in a public controversy.
The defendant first argued that the demise of the store was a
public controversy and since plaintiffs were involved with the
store they must be public figures.1S The court rejected this contention holding that even if the demise of the store was a public
controversy, "merely doing business with parties to a public con108. In holding Reliance to be a public figure, the court stated: "When such reporting concerns the financial transactions of a large public corporation, the public
interest in maintaining the free marketplace of ideas must outweigh plaintiff's
claim to the sanctity of private status." Id. (emphasis added).
109. 25 Cal. 3d 763, 603 P.2d 14, 160 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1979).
110. Id. at 766, 603 P.2d at 15, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
111. Id. at 770-71, 603 P.2d at 18-19, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 101-12.
112. Id.
113. Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Cal.
1977). The court in Vegod cited the unqualified rejection of the Gertz argument,
the lack of difference between corporations and humans argument, and the fuzzy

line argument.
114. Vegod Corp. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 25 Cal. 3d 763, 769-70, 603 P.2d
14, 17-18, 160 Cal. Rptr. 97, 101 (1979). In the previous three cases dealing with the
application of Gertz to corporate defamation plaintiffs, the plaintiffs were all held
to be public figures.
115. Vegod Corp. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 25 Cal. 3d 763, 769, 603 P.2d 14,
17, 160 Cal. Rptr. 97, 101.

Comments

[VOL. 18: 721, 1981]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

6
troversy does not elevate one to public figure status.""
Defendant's second argument was that by advertising and selling goods to the public, plaintiffs became public figures." 7 The
court answered this contention by stating that there is a distinction between public controversy and public interest (but it failed
to tell us what that distinction is). The court then held "that a
person in the business world advertising his wares does not necessarily become part of an existing public controversy."" 8 Thus,
here a court attempting to apply Gertz to corporations has again
found itself defining a public figure based on the nature of the
subject matter. The court in effect held that commercial conduct
can never be a public controversy." 9 This statement seems to
conflict with both Trans World and Reliance Insurance which
both involved commercial conduct 120 and both used "public inter1
est" language to define public figures. 12
These four cases illustrate the need for a clear statement on the
following. First, what if any, is the true distinction between public interest and public controversy? Second, what guidelines
should be used by courts in determining whether defamation involves issues of public interest or public controversy? Finally,
what standard, the Rosenbloom public interest standard or the
Gertz public figure/private figure standard, should apply to corporate defamation plaintiffs?
CONCLUSION

What does public interest or public controversy mean and what
guidelines should be used to determine if it exists? As is evident
from the four corporate cases discussed above, courts often confuse and use interchangeably the terms public interest and public
116. Id.
117. Id. at 769, 603 P.2d at 18, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
118. Id. at 770, 603 P.2d at 18, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
119. Id.
120. Reliance Insurance Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) involved issuance of plaintiffs stock upon which defendant commented. Certainly
this was criticism of commercial conduct that received protection. Trans World
Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Cal. 1977) involved an
FTC complaint issued against Trans World upon which defendant commented.
This also was criticism of commercial conduct that received protection.
121. Reliance Insurance Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1349 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 820 (N.D. Cal.
1977).

controversy. In Martin Marietta, the court labeled the issues
22
raised by the article as issues of "legitimate public interest."1
Two sentences later, the court called the alleged activities a public controversy.123 In Trans World, the court noted the function of
the FTC as guarding the public interest.124 It then held that since
the FTC acted in the public interest, Trans World Accounts was
drawn into a public controversy.125 In Reliance Insurance, the
court held that to be a public figure, Reliance must be involved in
a public controversy;126 but the court then went on to talk about
how financial reporting is in the public interest. 27 In Vegod, the
court distinguished between public interest and public conroversy, but then held, contrary to Trans World and Reliance Insurance, that criticism of commercial conduct cannot benefit from
28
the actual malice test.
To find the meaning of these terms, a look at the goals of the
first amendment privilege is necessary. In New York Times, the
Supreme Court stated "the constitutional safeguard (first amendment) 'was fashioned to assure the unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired
by the people.' 1129 The Court in New York Times created the first
amendment defamation privilege against the background of a
"profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
30
public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open."1
These statements indicate that the essential value promoted by
the first amendment is the widespread dissemination of information to enable the people to effectively govern themselves.131 This
122. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 956
(D.D.C. 1976).
123. Id.
124. Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 820 (N.D.
Cal. 1977).

125. Id.
126. Reliance Insurance Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 134, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
127. Id.
128. Vegod Corp. v. American Broadcasting Cos. 25 Cal. 3d 763, 769-70, 603 P.2d
14, 18, 160 Cal. Rptr. 97, 101 (1979).
129. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (quoting Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
130. Id. at 270.
131. See also Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Counsel, 425 U.S.
748 (1976), where the Supreme Court discusses the value of commercial advertis-

ing in terms of first amendment self government values.
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous

private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the
free flow of commercial information is indispensable. And if it is indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system, it is
also indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that

system ought to be regulated or altered.
Id. at 765.
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idea of effective self-government should be the essential objective
of and the guideline to the public interest or public controversy
test. Whether a subject matter is labeled public interest under
the Rosenbloom test or public controversy under the Gertz test,
the goal of effective self-governance is the same. Therefore, one
term could be coined to connote the same idea contained in both
the terms.
The term "legitimate public interest" is proposed. This term
would replace the use of the term "public interest" which has
been loosely applied to all subject matters. It would also replace
the confusing use of the term "public controversy" in the Gertz
public figure/private figure test. To find an issue of legitimate
public interest, the guideline to use would be the idea of self-governance. If information on the topic is essential to the self-governance of people in their daily lives, then the subject is one of
legitimate public interest. Thus, under the Rosenbloom public interest test, if one is somehow involved in an issue of legitimate
public interest, then the plaintiff must prove actual malice. Under
the Gertz public figure/private figure test, if one voluntarily becomes involved in an issue of legitimate public interest, then the
plaintiff would have to prove actual malice.
What standard should apply in corporate defamation cases to
determine the existence of a first amendment privilege? The public interest test of Rosenbloom and Martin Marietta and the public figure/private figure test of Gertz and Trans World represent
the two opposing views on the issue. Because of the nature of the
protected interests involved in corporate defamation cases, Martin Marietta thought Rosenbloom more appropriately balanced
the competing reputational and first amendment interests.132
Trans World, on the other hand, criticized this approach saying
that Gertz unqualifiedly rejected Rosenbloom;133 that under California law, corporations and humans are treated the same in defamation cases; 134 and that the line between corporations and sole
proprietorships or partnerships is often "fuzzy."

35

132. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 956

(D.D.C. 1976).
133. Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 819 (N.D.
Cal. 1977).
134. Id.
135. Id.

The first two of these criticisms are not helpful in resolving the
issue of which standard to apply to corporate defamation plaintiffs. The idea that Gertz unqualifiedly rejected the Rosenbloom
public interest test is just an interpretation of Gertz. Another acceptable interpretation is that Gertz was speaking only of natural
person defamation plaintiffs when it rejected the Rosenbloom
test. As for the second criticism, Di Giorgio136 demonstrated the
difference in the nature of reputational interests between corporate plaintiffs and human plaintiffs.137
Perhaps the most potent and valid criticism Trans World makes
of Martin Marietta is the "fuzzy" distinction criticism. If there is
no difference, except the legal act of incorporation, between small
corporations and most private businesses,13 8 why should there be
a different standard between the two to determine the existence
of a privilege?
Prior to Gertz there was no need to distinguish between private
businesses and corporations. The Rosenbloom public interest test
with its emphasis on the nature of the subject matter applied to
all plaintiffs. But, Gertz instructs us to focus on the status of the
individual's reputation. If the reputation has remained personal
to the individual then the person is a private figure and the privilege does not apply. Nevertheless, Gertz does not take into account corporations which do not have personal reputations. How
then should Gertz be applied to corporations?
Three options come to mind. The first would be to do away
with the Gertz public figure/private figure test altogether and revert back to the Rosenbloom public interest test for all plaintiffs.
This option is unlikely to occur in light of the Supreme Court's
deep concern for the personal reputation of the individual. The
second option would be to hold that corporate plaintiffs are always public figures because they lack the personal reputation
sought to be protected in Gertz. This option, however, ignores the
state's valid interest in protecting the business reputation of corporations. The most appropriate option would be to apply the Rosenbloom public interest standard to both corporations and
individuals suing for damage to their business reputation. This
subject matter oriented test would adequately balance the state's
interest in a corporation's and individual's business reputation
with the first amendment interests.
The reputational interests of private businesses and corpora136. Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. American Fed'n of Labor and Congress of Indus.
Organizations, 215 Cal. App. 2d 560, 570-71, 30 Cal. Rptr. 350, 356 (1979).

137. See text accompanying notes 87-89 supra.
138. "Private businesses" refers to all non-incorporated businesses.
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tions are very similar. A corporation may sue for damage to its
business reputation as distinguished from damage to any personal reputation which the corporation lacks.139 When a person
sues for damage to his business, trade, or occupation, the same
distinction is made between interests in business reputation and
interests in personal reputation.14 0 Defamatory words which tend
to '"prejudice another in his business trade or profession" are actionable.14 ' This type of action requires that the plaintiff be engaged in, and that the defamatory words relate to, the type of
42
business, trade or profession which is the subject of the action.
The defamatory words must damage the plaintiff in his business,
trade, or profession; "it is insufficient that they merely reflect on
him as an individual." 43 Thus, when a natural person is suing, a
distinction is made between a business reputation and a private
reputation, while a corporation only has a business reputation.
It is the state's interest in the personal reputation of the natural
person which Gertz thought unsatisfactorily protected by the Rosenbloom public interest test.144 Gertz found that this interest in
personal reputation "reflects no more than our basic concept of
essential dignity and worth of every human being" and is a "basic
of our constitutional system."' 4 5 Private business and corporate
defamation plaintiffs lack this personal reputation. Therefore,
since there is no "basic of our constitutional system" to balance
against the first amendment interests, the first amendment need
not yield as far as it did in Gertz. Because personal reputation is
not at stake when private businesses or corporations sue for damage to their business reputation, it is ridiculous to say that they
could be private figures with private reputations under Gertz.
Thus, in private business and corporate defamation cases a different standard than the Gertz public figure/private figure test is
139. "[A corporation] can maintain an action for a libel or a slander respecting
its business or credit.... The courts are agreed, however, that since no question
of such reputation can be involved, recovery may not be had for injury to a corporation's personal reputation." Id. 50 AM. JuP. 2d Libel and Slander § 315 (1970).
140. Id. at § 102.
141. Id.
142. Id. at § 104.
143. Id.
144. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947,
955 (D.D.C. 1976).
145. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974), (citing Rosenblatt v.
Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (concurring opinion)).

needed when determining the applicability of the first amendment privilege.
The Rosenbloom public interest test would be the appropriate
test to apply. Application of the public interest test would resolve
the dilemma of how to apply the public figure/private figure test
which seeks to protect personal reputations to defamation cases
involving private businesses and corporations which do not involve personal reputations. The state does have an interest in
protecting business reputations. 4 6 The public interest test would
adequately balance the state's interests in business reputations
and the first amendment values of free speech and press. The
protection would come from the fact that with the strengthened
term "legitimate public interest" not all issues would give rise to
the qualified privilege. If a private business or corporation sues
for defamation about a subject of legitimate public interest (information essential to self-government), then the first amendment
defamation privilege would require them to prove actual malice.
The Supreme Court needs to reenter the area of the first
amendment defamation privilege to clarify how the public figure/
private figure test is to be applied. First, the Court needs to either
define the distinction, if any, between the terms public controversy and public interest or combine the two into the stronger "legitimate public interest" term. Second, the applicability of Gertz
in the context of the corporate plaintiff needs to be resolved. The
Gertz public figure/private figure test should be limited to individual plaintiffs suing for harm to their personal reputation while
the Rosenbloom public interest test should apply to private business and corporations. This scheme would be an appropriate
method for determining when a case gives rise to the qualified
first amendment defamation privilege.

JoHN HILBERT

146. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947,
955 (D.D.C. 1976).

